We study the state-dependent (SD) wiretap channel (WTC) with non-causal channel state information (CSI) at the encoder. This model subsumes all instances of CSI availability as special cases, and calls for an efficient utilization of the state sequence for both reliability and security purposes. A lower bound on the secrecy-capacity, that improves upon the previously best known result published by Prabhakaran et al., is derived based on a novel superposition coding scheme. Our achievability gives rise to the exact secrecy-capacity characterization of a class of SD-WTCs that decompose into a product of two WTCs, one independent of the state and the other depends only on the state. The results are derived under the strict semantic-security metric that requires negligible information leakage for all message distributions. 1 see also [7] for a related work focused solely on secret key agreement 0018-9448
I. INTRODUCTION
R ELIABLY transmitting a message over a noisy state-dependent (SD) channel with non-causal encoder channel state information (CSI) is a fundamental problem information-theoretic problem. Its formulation and capacity derivation date back to Gelfand and Pinsker (GP) [1] . A key virtue of the GP model is its generality. Namely, it is the most general instance of a SD point-to-point channel in which any or all of the terminals have non-causal access to CSI. Motivated by the above together with the importance of security in modern communication systems, we study the SD wiretap channel (WTC) with non-causal encoder CSI, which incorporates security versus a wiretapper into the GP channel coding paradigm.
The study of secret communication over noisy channels was pioneered by Wyner, who introduced the degraded WTC and derived its secrecy-capacity [2] . Csiszár and Körner extended Wyner's result to the non-degraded WTC [3] . These two results formed the basis for the study of physical layer security and spawned a variety of works on related topics, among which are SD-WTCs. The interest in WTCs with random states relates to the observation that knowledge of the state sequence may be exploited as an additional source of randomness to boost secrecy performance. This oftentimes involves decorrelating the transmission and the state sequence so as to avoid leaking information that might compromise security. Reliable transmission over SD channels, on the other hand, favors coherent strategies that correlate the channel input and the state. Resolving the tension between these two utilizations of the transmitter CSI is the main challenge in the considered communication scenario.
The first to consider a discrete and memoryless (DM) WTC with random states were Chen and Han Vinck [4] , who studied the encoder CSI scenario. They established a lower bound on the secrecy-capacity based on a combination of wiretap coding with GP coding (see also [5] for the special case where the WTC is driven by a pair of states, one available to the encoder and the other one to the decoder). Their achievable rate, however, was shown to be suboptimal in general in a later work by Chia and El-Gamal [6] . In that work, a coding scheme that uses both wiretap coding and secret key agreement 1 was proposed for the scenario where the encoder has causal access to the state sequence, while the decoder has full CSI. Despite the restriction to use the state causally, the authors of [6] proved that their scheme can strictly outperform the adaptations of the non-causal schemes from [4] , [5] to the encoder and decoder CSI setup. Subsequent related works include achievability results for the WTC with correlated sources [8] , action-dependent SD-WTCs [9] and WTCs with generalized feedback [10] . The benchmark result for the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI considered here is the one derived by Prabhakaran et al. [11] , via a two layered superposition coding scheme. As a consequence of the analysis in [11] , the inner layer of their superposition code is restricted to be independent of the state. However, such coding distributions are suboptimal in general.
In this paper we propose a novel superposition-based coding scheme for the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI, in which both layers are correlated with the state. The scheme results in a lower bound on the secrecy-capacity, which recovers the previously best known achievability formula from [11] (as well as all preceding works) as a special case. The correlation between the inner layer of the superposition code and the state is fundamental as it allows our scheme to strictly outperform that of [11] for certain instances of the considered model. Our achievability formula also gives rise to new secrecy-capacity results. In particular, we derive the semantic-security (SS) capacity of a class of SD-WTCs that decompose into a WTC that is independent of the state and another channel that generates two noisy versions of the state, each observed either by the legitimate receiver or by the eavesdropper.
We use an over-populated superposition codebook and encode the entire confidential message at the outer layer. The transmission is correlated with the state sequence by means of the likelihood encoder [12] , while security is ensured by making the eavesdropper decode the inner layer codeword that contains no confidential information. Having done so, the eavesdropper is lacking the resources to extract any information about the secret message. Superposition-based code constructions for secrecy purposes have been considered before in the context of lossy source coding in [13] - [16] , where the eavesdropper was also allowed to decode a layer that contains no useful information Our results are derived under the strict metric of SS. This criterion is a cryptographic benchmark that was adapted to suit the information-theoretic framework (of computationally unbounded adversaries) in [17] . In that work, SS was shown to be equivalent to a negligible mutual information between the message and the eavesdropper's observations, for all message distributions. In contrast to our stringent security requirement, all the aforementioned results were derived under the weak-secrecy metric, i.e., a vanishing normalized mutual information with respect to a uniformly distributed message. Nowadays, however, weak-secrecy is regarded as being insufficient, giving rise to the recent effort of upgrading information-theoretic secrecy results to strong-secrecy (by removing the normalization factor but keeping the uniformity assumption on the message). SS further strengthens both these; consequently, our achievability result outperforms the schemes from [4] , [5] , [11] for the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI, not only in terms of the achievable secrecy rate, but also in the upgraded sense of security it guarantees.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides notation, basic definitions and properties. In Section III we describe the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI and state the lower bound on its SS-capacity. Section IV discusses our result, compares it to previous works, and states some tight SS-capacity results. The proof of our main theorem is provided in Section V. Section VI summarizes the main achievements and insights of this work.
II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
We use the following notation. N is the set of natural numbers (0 is not included), while R denotes the reals. We also define R + = {x ∈ R|x ≥ 0} and R ++ = {x ∈ R|x > 0}. Given a, b ∈ R, we use [a : b] for the set of integers n ∈ N a ≤ n ≤ b . Calligraphic letters denote sets, e.g., X , the complement of X is X c , while |X | stands for its cardinality. X n is the n-fold Cartesian product of X . An element of X n is denoted by x n = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ); whenever the dimension n is clear from the context, we use boldface letters, e.g., x, for vectors (or sequences). A substring of x ∈ X n is designated by x j i = (x i , x i+1 , . . . , x j ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n; when i = 1, the subscript is omitted. We also define x n\i = (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x n ). Random variables are denoted by uppercase letters, e.g., X, with similar conventions for random vectors.
Let X , F , P be a probability space, where X is the sample space, F is the σ-algebra and P is the probability measure. Random variables over X , F , P are denoted by uppercase letters, e.g., X, with conventions for random vectors similar to those for deterministic sequences. The probability of an event A ∈ F is P(A), while P(A B ) is the conditional probability of A given B. We use 1 A for the indicator function of A, while p
(U)
A is the uniform distribution over A. The set of all probability mass functions (PMFs) on a finite set X is:
In our notation for PMFs we oftentimes use subscripts to identify the involved random variable(s) and its possible conditioning. For example, for a discrete probability space X , F , P and two random variables X and Y over that space, we use p X , p X,Y and p X|Y to denote, respectively, the marginal PMF of X, the joint PMF of (X, Y ) and the conditional PMF of X given Y . In particular, p X|Y is a stochastic matrix whose elements are p X|Y (x|y) = P X = x|Y = y . Expressions such as p X,Y = p X p Y |X are to be understood in the pointwise sense, i.e., p X,Y (x, y) = p X (x)p Y |X (y|x), for all (x, y) ∈ X ×Y. Accordingly, when three random variables X, Y and Z satisfy p X|Y,Z = p X|Y , they form a Markov chain, which we denote by X − Y − Z. Subscripts of a PMF are omitted if the arguments are lowercase versions of the random variables.
For a discrete measurable space (X , F ), a PMF q ∈ P(X ) induces a probability measure on (X , F ), denoted by P q ; accordingly, P q A) = x∈A q(x), for every A ∈ F. We use E q for an expectation taken with respect to P q . Similarly, we use H q and I q for entropy or mutual information terms that are calculated with respect to q. For a sequence of random variables X n , if the entries of X n are drawn in an i.i.d. manner according to p X , then for every x ∈ X n we have p X n (
where N (x|x) = n i=1 1 {xi=x} . We use T n (p) to denote the set of letter-typical sequences of length n with respect to p ∈ P(X ) and > 0 [18, Chapter 3], i.e., we have
For a countable X and p, q ∈ P(X ), the relative entropy (Kullback-Leibler divergence) between p and q is
and the total variation between them is
Relative entropy dominates total variation through Pinsker's inequality [19, Theorem 4.1] : for any p, q ∈ P(X )
There is no reverse Pinsker's inequality in general, but a reverse asymptotic relation sometimes holds [20, Remark 1].
Lemma 1 (Total Variation vs. Relative Entropy)
Let X be a finite set and p n n∈N be a sequence of distributions with p n ∈ P(X n ). Let q ∈ P(X ) and assume p n q n for every n ∈ N. Then
III. WIRETAP CHANNELS WITH RANDOM STATES NON-CAUSALLY AVAILABLE AT THE ENCODER
We study the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI. A novel achievability bound is derived that, in some cases, strictly outperforms the previously best coding scheme.
A. Problem Setup
Let S, X , Y and Z be finite sets. The S, X , Y, Z, p S , p Y,Z|X,S DM SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI is shown in Fig. 1 . A state sequence s ∈ S n that is i.i.d. according to p S is revealed non-causally to the sender. Upon observing s and choosing a message m ∈ 1 : 2 nR , the sender maps them onto a channel input sequence x ∈ X n (the mapping may be random), which is fed into a DM SD-WTC with transition probability p Y,Z|X,S . The outputs y ∈ Y n and z ∈ Z n are observed by the receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. Based on y, the receiver produces an estimatem of m. The eavesdropper tries to glean whatever it can about the message from z.
Remark 1 (Model Generality)
The considered model is the most general instance of a SD-WTC with non-causal CSI known at some or all of the terminals. The seemingly broadest setup one may consider is when the SD-WTC pỸ ,Z|X,S1,S2,S3 is driven by a triple of correlated states (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ) ∼ p S1,S2,S3 , where S 1 , S 2 and S 3 are known to the transmitter, receiver and eavesdropper, respectively. However, setting S = S 1 , Y = (Ỹ , S 2 ), Z = (Z, S 3 ) in a SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI and defining the channel's transition kernel as p Y,Z|X,S = p (Ỹ ,S2),(Z,S3)|X,S1 = p S2,S3|S1 pỸ ,Z|X,S1,S2,S3 , (8) one recovers this general SD-WTC from our model. The encoder CSI only model also supports a public or a private bit-pipe (respectively, from the transmitter to the receiver and the eavesdropper, or to the receiver only), in addition to, or instead of, the noisy channel.
Definition 1 (Code) An (n, R)-code c n for the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI has a message set M n 1 : 2 nR , a stochastic encoder f n : M n × S n → P(X n ) and a decoder φ n : Y n →M n , whereM n = M n ∪ {e} and e / ∈ M n .
For any message distribution p M ∈ P(M n ) and an (n, R)-code c n , the induced joint PMF on S n × M n × X n × Y n × Z n ×M n is P (cn) (s, m, x, y, z,m) =p n S (s)p M (m)f n (x|m, s) × p n Y,Z|X,S (y, z|x, s)1 m=φn(y) .
The performance of c n is evaluated in terms of its rate R, the maximal decoding error probability and the SS-metric.
Definition 2 (Maximal Error Probability)
The maximal error probability of an (n, R)-code c n is
where e m (c n ) = 
where P (cn) is given in (9) . The SS metric under c n is
Definition 4 (Achievability) A number R ∈ R + is called an achievable SS-rate for the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI if for every > 0 and sufficiently large n there exists a CR (n, R)-code c n with
Definition 5 (SS-Capacity) The SS-capacity C Sem of the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI is the supremum of the set of achievable SS-rates.
B. Main Result
Our main result is a novel lower bound on the SS-capacity of the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI. Let U and V be finite sets and for p U,V,X|S :
where the mutual information terms are calculated with respect to the joint distribution p S p U,V,X|S p Y,Z|X,S , i.e., such that
Theorem 1 (SD-WTC SS-Capacity Lower Bound) The SS-capacity of the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI is lower bounded by
and one may restrict the cardinalities of U and V to |U| ≤ |S X | + 5 and |V| ≤ |S| 2 |X | 2 + 5|S X | + 3.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section V and is based on a superposition coding scheme for secrecy. The entire secret message is encoded in the outer layer of the superposition codebook encodes, with no confidential information carried in its inner layer. As explained next, the coding distribution is chosen so that the inner layer is better observable by the eavesdropper. This makes the eavesdropper 'waste' channel resources on decoding it, leaving insufficient resources to extract information about the secret message. The outer codebook is designed to give a physical layer advantage to the legitimate parties, thus enabling wiretap coding to conceal the confidential message. The transmission is correlated with the state sequence by means of the likelihood encoder [12] . The SS analysis relies on the soft-covering for superposition codes (Lemma 4) and an expurgation argument (see, e.g., [21, Theorem 7.7.1]).
Remark 2 (Optimal Distributions) Note the following:
1) The joint distribution in (15) 
However, since in all the mutual information terms from (15) the auxiliary random variable V appears next to U or conditioned on it, we may replace V withṼ = (U, V ) without changing the rate. Thus, one may restrict optimization to distributions with Expanding the first expression as
we see that if p U,V,X|S satisfies I(U ; Z) < I(U ; Y ), then taking U = 0 achieves a higher rate.
where the maximization is over all p V,X|S and p U|V satisfying
forms a Markov chain. The coding scheme employed in [23] is reminiscent of the superposition code proposed herein, though the analysis is different. As noted in Section I, the usage of superposition coding for SD-WTCs seems to have originated from [11] (see also [13] ). Secret key capacity is generally higher than secret message capacity, and therefore, the above lower bound does not directly apply to our model. Furthermore, [24] showed that [23, Theorem 1] is missing a condition to be correct. The missing condition would have ensured that the legitimate receiver can decode the inner layer codebook without relying on the outer layer. Without it, [24] constructed a counterexample for which the right-hand side (RHS) of (17) exceeds C SK .
C. Alternative Characterization of Achievable Rate
The formula for R A can be restated in an alternative, yet equivalent, form. As before, let U and V be alphabets with cardinality bounds as in Theorem 1, and for any p U,V,X|S :
where the underlying joint distribution is p S p U,V,X|S p Y,Z|X,S .
Proposition 1 (Alternative Characterization of R
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix D. The main challenge is showing that R Alt A ≤ R A . This is since in R Alt A , the legitimate user may not be able to reliably decode the (inner) U layer of the superposition codebook separately. Decoding U in R Alt A is possible, in general, only with the assistance of the (outer) V layer. This is evident from the second and third rate bounds in R Alt A . Indeed, even if an input distribution p U,V,X|S induces I(U ; Y ) < I(U ; S), it still might result in a positive achievable rate. In contrast, R A only allows input distributions with I(U ; Y ) ≥ I(U ; S), under which U is decodable on its own by the legitimate user. This discrepancy is resolved by the fact optimal input distributions for R Alt A always satisfy I(U ; Y ) ≥ I(U ; S) (see the proof in Appendix D).
IV. SPECIAL CASES AND EXAMPLES

A. Comparison to Previous Benchmark
Theorem 1 recovers the previously best known achievable secrecy rate over SD-WTCs with non-causal encoder CSI, due to Prabhakarn et al. [11] . Theorem 2 of [11] established a tradeoff between achievable secret message and secret key rate pairs. Specializing their result to the secret message only scenario implies the achievability of
where, for any p U ∈ P(U) and p V,X|U,S : U ×S → P(V ×X ),
and the mutual information terms are taken with respect to p S p U p V,X|U,S p Y,Z|S,X , i.e., such U and S are independent and (U, V ) − (S, X) − (Y, Z) forms a Markov chain. The difference between R PER and R A from Theorem 1 is that the former requires U to be independent of S. This essentially means that R PER does not support GP coding in the inner layer of the superposition code. Our scheme, on the other hand, supports inner layer GP coding so long as it is decodable by the legitimate receiver. Thus, U and S may be correlated in R A but must satisfy I(U ; Y ) ≥ I(U ; S). As explained next, independent S and U are suboptimal in general.
Clearly, Theorem 1 recovers R PER by restricting U to be independent of S in R A . This restriction is valid as it satisfies I(U ; S) = 0. Furthermore, there are instances of SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI for which R A is strictly larger than R PER . In concurrent work with collaborators [24] , we construct a particular example of such a channel (see Section V-A therein). The idea is to consider a channel for which GP coding is necessary in order to attain capacity (e.g., Memory with Stuck-at-Faults) and force communication to happen in the inner layer of the codebook (by considering a strong eavesdropper). As the scheme from [11] does not allow inner layer GP coding, it achieves rates strictly below capacity. Our scheme, on the other hand, is optimal for the considered setup. This establishes the suboptimality of R PER and illuminates the fundamental role of the correlation between U and S for secure transmission over SD-WTCs with non-causal encoder CSI.
Lastly, we note that the result from [11] was derived under the weak-secrecy metric. 3 Our achievability ensures SS, and thus Theorem 1 improves upon [11, Theorem 2] , not only in the rate it achieves, but also in the sense of security it guarantees.
Remark 6 (WTC with Correlated Sources)
Another related setup is that of the WTC with correlated sources [8] , where the WTC p Y,Z|X is not SD and two correlated sources (S, S 1 ) ∼ p n S,S1 are observed non-causally by the encoder and the legitimate receiver, respectively. In [8] , 
where the joint distribution is p S,S1 p S|S p T,X p Y,Z|X , and [x] + =max{0, x}, was established as a lower bound on the weak-secrecy capacity of that model. Setting U = 0 and V = (T, W ) into R PER p U p V,X|U,S from (20b) and maximizing over p W |S p T,X recovers (21) . Thus, Theorem 1 also subsumes the result of [8] .
B. An Earlier Benchmark by Chen and Han Vinck
The benchmark result for the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI prior to [11] is due to Chen and Han Vinck [4] . Theorem 2 of [4] lower bounds the weak-secrecy capacity by
where for any p V,X|S : S → P(V × X ),
and the mutual information terms are with respect to
The code construction that achieves R CHV combines GP coding and wiretap coding. A single-layered codebook is employed, in which the bins are large enough to simultaneously facilitate correlating the transmission with the state and confusing the eavesdropper. This construction is evident from the structure of the achievability formula by rewriting
The later work [5] studied a SD-WTC driven by a pair of pairwise i.i.d. state sequences (S, S 1 ) ∼ p n S,S1 (the channel transition matrix is pỸ ,Z|X,S,S1 ). The encoder has non-causal access to S, while the legitimate receiver has S 1 . As explained in Remark 1, however, this instance is a special case of [4] by taking Y = (Ỹ , S 1 ) and setting p Y,Z|X,S = p (Ỹ ,S1),Z|X,S = p S1|S pỸ ,Z|X,S,S1 . The achievability of R CHV is recovered from Theorem 1 (and from R PER or R A ) by setting U = 0.
Remark 7 (Suboptimality of [4]) In [6], Chia and El
Gamal showed that R CHV is suboptimal in general. Specifically, [6] studied a SD-WTC with causal encoder CSI and full decoder CSI. Their coding scheme generated a cryptographic key from the state sequence, which is in turn used to one-time pad a part of the confidential message. The other part of the message is protected via wiretap coding. Despite the causality restriction, this strategy was shown to achieve strictly higher rates than the one from [4] for certain classes of SD-WTCs.
C. Tight SS-Capacity Results
1) Reversely Less Noisy SD-WTC with Full Encoder and
Noisy Decoder and Eavesdropper CSI: Let S 1 , S 2 be finite sets and consider a SD-WTC pỸ ,Z|X,S with non-causal encoder CSI, whereỸ = (Y, S 1 ),Z = (Z, S 2 ) and p S1,S2,Y,Z|X,S = p S1,S2|S p Y,Z|X . Evidently, p S1,S2,Y,Z|X,S decomposes into a product of two WTCs, one independent of the state, and the other depends only on it. The legitimate receiver (respectively, the eavesdropper) observes both Y (respectively, Z) from p n Y,Z|X and S 1 (respectively, S 2 ). The latter is S passed through (the marginal of) p n S1,S2|S . We characterize the SS-capacity of this setting when p Y,Z|X is reversely less noisy, i.e., when I(U ; Y ) ≤ I(U ; Z), for every random variable U with U − X − (Y, Z). After submitting this paper, we became aware of an independent derivation of this result under an average error probability and the weak-secrecy metric [10] . That work derived an achievable rate region based on secret key agreement for the WTC with generalized feedback. Although being different from the setup considered herein, both capture the less noisy SD-WTC as a special case. 4 Both achievability results (our Theorem 1 and [10, Theorem 1]) are tight for this instance.
To state the result, let A, B be finite sets, and for any p X ∈ P(X ), p A|S : S → P(A) and p B|A :
where the mutual information terms are with respect to
form Markov chains (on top of the Markov relations induced by the channels).
Corollary 1 (Reversely Less Noisy SD-WTC SS-Capacity)
The SS-capacity of the reversely less noisy WTC with full encoder and noisy decoder and eavesdropper CSI is
A proof of Corollary 1, where the direct part is derived from Theorem 1, is given in Appendix E. Instead, one can establish achievability of (25) via an explicit coding scheme based on key agreement through multiple blocks and one-time pad operations. To gain insight, an outline of the scheme for the case where S 2 = 0 is given Below. It shows that in the absence of correlated observations with S at the eavesdropper's site, one may design a secure transmission strategy over a single block. Notwithstanding, a single block coding scheme is feasible even when S 2 is not a constant, via the superposition code from the proof of Theorem 1.
Explicit Achievability for Corollary 1:
Observe that when S 2 = 0, setting B = 0 in (25) is optimal. The resulting ratẽ
for any fixed p X and p A|S as before, is achieved as follows 5 : i) Generate 2 nRA a-codewords as i.i.d. samples from p n A . ii) Partition the set of a-codewords into 2 nR Bin equal sized bins. Label each a-codeword as a(b, k), where b ∈ 1 : 2 nR Bin and k ∈ 1 : 2 n(RA−R Bin ) .
iii) Generate a point-to-point codebook that comprises 2 n(R+R Bin ) codewords x(m, b), where m ∈ M n and b ∈ 1 : 2 nR Bin , drawn from to p n X . iv) Upon observing s ∈ S n , the encoder searches the a-codebook for an a-codeword that is jointly-typical with s, with respect to p S p A|S . Such a codeword is found with high probability if 
v) The legitimate receiver first decodes the x-codeword using y. Reliable decoding requires the total number of x-codewords to be less than the capacity p Y |X , i.e.,
Denoting the decoded indices by (m,b) ∈ M n × 1 : 2 nR Bin , the decoder then uses the noisy state observation s 1 ∈ S n 1 to isolate the exact a-codeword from thê b-th bin. Namely, it searches for a unique indexk ∈ 1 : 2 n(RA−R Bin ) , such that a(b,k), s 1 are jointlytypical with respect to p A,S1 (the marginal of p S p S1|S p A|S ). The probability of error in doing so is arbitrarily small with the blocklength, provided that
Having decoded (m,b) andk, the decoder declaresm m ⊕k as the decoded message.
vi) For the eavesdropper, note that although it has the correct (m, b) (due to the less noisy condition), it cannot decode k since it has no observation that is correlated with A, S or S 1 . Security of the protocol, therefore, follows by the security of the one-time pad. vii) Putting the above bounds together establishes the achievability ofR RLN p X , p A|S .
2) Semi-Deterministic SD-WTC with Non-Causal Encoder CSI: Another observation is that R
In fact, the achievability results from [4] , [5] are sufficient to attain optimality in this case. We state this secrecy-capacity result merely because, to the best of our knowledge, it was not explicitly stated before.
Corollary 2 (Semi-Deterministic SD-WTCM SS-Capacity)
The SS-capacity of the semi-deterministic SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI is
where the entropy terms are calculated with respect to
The achievability of C Semi−Det follows by setting U = 0 and V = Y (a valid choice for deterministic channels) in Theorem 1. The converse follows by standard techniquessee Appendix F. Note that the SS-capacity is unaffected by whether or not the eavesdropper's channel is deterministic. Letting Z = z(X, S), for some z : S × X → Z does not changes the result of Corollary 2.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Fix > 0 and a conditional PMF p U,V,X|S : S → P(U × V × X ), for which the induced single-letter distribution
Mn be a uniformly distributed message. We first prove the existence of codes with an arbitrarily small average error probability and a vanishing strong secrecy metric. 6 The expurgation method is then used to upgrade reliability to a vanishing maximal error probability and upgrade strong secrecy to SS.
Codebook C n : We use a superposition codebook that encodes the confidential message in its outer layer. The codebook is drawn independently of the state sequence S, but with sufficient redundancy to correlate the transmission with it.
Let I and J be independent uniform random variables over I n 1 : 2 nR1 and J n 1 : 2 nR2 , respectively. 7 Let C (n) U U(i) i∈In be a random inner layer codebook -a set of random vectors of length n that are i.i.d. according to p n U .
For the outer layer codebook, fix C (n) U and for every i ∈ I n let C (n)
∈Jn×Mn be a collection of i.i.d. random vectors of length n with distribution p n V |U=u(i) . A random outer layer codebook (with respect to an inner codebook C
denotes a fixed codebook. Let C n be the set of all possible outcomes of C n . The above construction induces a PMF μ ∈ P(C n ) over the codebook ensemble. For every C n ∈ C n , we have
(32) The encoder and decoder, for a fixed superposition codebook C n ∈ C n , are described next.
Encoder f Cn : We utilize the likelihood-encoder [12] , which enables to approximate the induced joint distribution by a simpler distribution used for the analysis.
To send m ∈ M n upon observing s ∈ S n , the encoder randomly chooses (i, j) ∈ I n × J n according tô
where p S|U,V is a conditional marginal distribution of p from (31) . The channel input sequence is then generated by feeding the chosen uand v-codewords along with the state sequence into a discrete and memoryless channel (DMC)
for all (m, s, x) ∈ M n × S n × X n . Decoder φ Cn : Define three decoding functions:
Here, e is the same error symbol from the definition ofM n , which is assumed e / ∈ M n ∪I n ∪J n . The role of ψ
is to decode the indices I and J, respectively. These functions will be used in the reliability analysis. Although, there is no reliability requirement on (I, J), the subsequently chosen codebook rates enable their decoding with high probability.
Upon observing y ∈ Y n , the decoder searches for a unique triple (î,ĵ,m) ∈ I n × J n × M n such that
If a unique triple is found, then φ Cn (y) =m, ψ
Approximating Distribution: We next show that P (Cn) is close in total variation to another distribution Q (Cn) , which we use for the reliability and security analyses. Let
(37)
For simplicity of notation, we sometimes abbreviate P M,I,J,U,V,S,X,Y,Z,M as P (Cn) and Q (Cn) , respectively. The following lemma states sufficient conditions for the expected value of the total variation between P (Cn) and Q (Cn) to converge exponentially fast to zero.
Lemma 2 (Sufficient Conditions for Approximation)
then there exist α > 0, such that for any n large enough
The proof of Lemma 2 relies Lemmas 4 and 5 from Appendix A (see Appendix G for details). Lemma 2 is key in analyzing the performance of the proposed code.
Average Error Probability Analysis: For the reliability part, we first show that the average error probability can be made arbitrarily small. At the last step of this proof, the codebook is expurgated to attain a vanishing maximal error probability (in accordance with Definition 4). The main idea here is to use Lemma 2 to move away from analyzing the error probability under P (Cn) to an analysis with respect to Q (Cn) . Analyzing the latter involves only standard typicality arguments.
The average error of a code c n , with an underlying superposition codebook C n , is
where the subscript P (Cn) on the RHS indicates that the probability measure is induced by P (Cn) from (36).
We first show that a sufficient condition for the RHS of (40) to be arbitrarily small is that the average error probability induced by the Q (Cn) PMF, i.e., P Q (Cn ) M = M , is small. Recall the following property of total variation (see, e.g., [12, Property (b)]). Let μ, ν be two probability measures on a (X , F ) and g : X → R be a non-negative measurable function bounded by b ∈ R. It holds that
For every n ∈ N, define g Cn : M n ×M n → R + as g Cn (m,m) = 1 {m =m} , and note that
For any C n we thus have
where (a) is because p X − q X TV ≤ p X,Y − q X,Y TV , for any p X,Y , q X,Y ∈ P(X × Y) with marginals p X and q X , respectively. Taking an expectation over the codebook ensemble, we have
Lemma 2 states that E μ P (Cn) − Q (Cn) can be made arbitrarily small with n, provided that (38) are satisfied. To show that the expected average error probability under Q (Cn) also converges to 0 with n, consider the following arguments. For any codebook C n ∈ C n and (ĩ,j,m) ∈ I n × J n × M n , define the event
where ∀(u, v, y) ∈ U ×V ×Y. The PMF p U,V,Y with respect to which we define the letter-typical set in (45) is a marginal of p from (31).
To bound the expected average error probability under Q (Cn) , for each C n ∈ C n , we extend Q (Cn) to the space M n ×S n ×I n ×J n ×U n ×V n ×X n ×Y n ×Z n ×M n ×Î n ×Ĵ n : By the law of large numbers P 1 → 0 as n → ∞, while P 2 , P 3 and P 4 also converge to 0 as n grows if
Specifically, (49a) implies that P 3 → 0 as n → ∞, while (49b) ensures that both P 2 → 0 and P 4 → 0 as n → ∞. A sufficient condition for the former is
However, (50) is redundant having (49b). Concluding, so long as (38) and (49) both hold, we have
Security Analysis: The security analysis shows that under proper conditions the induced conditional distribution of Z given (M, U) approximates the product distribution p n Z|U . To demonstrate this, we once again rely on the approximation of P (Cn) through Q (Cn) . It is first shown that if strong secrecy is achieved under Q (Cn) , then it is also achieved under P (Cn) . Strong secrecy is then upgraded to SS through expurgation. Having that, it remains to show that security is attainable under Q (Cn) . The following lemma justifies that strong secrecy under Q (Cn) implies strong secrecy under P (Cn) .
Lemma 3 (SS via Approximating Distribution)
Let C n ∈ C n be a superposition codebook for which there exists a β 1 > 0, such that for all sufficiently large n P (Cn)
Then, there exists a β 2 > 0, such that for any n large enough (possibly larger than the n needed for (52) to be valid)
The proof of Lemma 3 is relegated to Appendix H. As subsequently shown, the existence of a codebook C n that satisfies (52) follows by Lemma 2. For such a C n , we have
for n sufficiently large.
With that in mind, we focus on the mutual information term from the RHS of (54). For any C n ∈ C n , we have 
and the non-negativity or relative entropy. The inequality from (55) is true for any p Z|U : U → P(Z); we chose p Z|U as the conditional marginal p from (31) .
Recall that Q (Cn)
In 1 U=u(I) and take an expectation over the codebook ensemble on both sides of (55):
where (a) is by symmetry, while (b) is the law of total expectation. In step (b) above we switched from the notation E μ that emphasizes the distribution of the random codebook
, to a notation that states the random variables themselves (and their possible conditioning).
The inner (conditional) expectation from the RHS of (57) is evaluated next. We present an argument for decorrelating the relative entropy inside the expectation and the inner layer random codebook C (n) U . This enables removing the conditioning from the inner expectation, which simplifies the term and adjusts it to the framework of the SCL from [26, Corollary VII.5] . Applying this SCL, in turn, implies strong secrecy.
Fix u ∈ U n , an inner layer codebook C
U , and consider the quantity
For each u ∈ U n , letC 
where, as before,C
Let C 
This follows by the independence between μ andμ. Inserting (61) into the RHS of (57), we obtain
where (a) is because U(1) ∼ q n U , while (b) uses the relative entropy chain rule. The RHS of (62) falls within the framework of [26, Corollary VII.5] and it converges exponentially fast to zero as n → ∞, provided 8
Code Extraction: Summarizing the results up to this point, we have that so long as (38), (49) and (63) hold, E μ e a (C n ) − −−− → n→∞ 0 and, for sufficiently large n,
for someγ > 0 independent of n. The Selection Lemma from [27, Lemma 5] implies the existence of a sequence of superposition codebooks C n n∈N (giving rise to a sequence of (n, R)-codes c n n∈N ), for which
where (65b) holds for n large enough and some γ > 0. Through the relation from (54), we further deduce that there exists δ > 0 such that for sufficiently large n
It is left to upgrade the vanishing average error probability and strong secrecy metric to a vanishing maximal error probability and SS. This is done by expurgating the superposition codebook [21, Theorem 7.7.1] (see also [28] ). Let n be sufficiently large, so that e a (C n ) = 1 M n m∈Mn P P (Cn ) M = m|M = m ≤ 3 (67a)
The fraction of messages that induce an error probability greater than is less than 1 3 . Similarly, the fraction of messages with relative entropy greater than is less than 1 3 . Therefore, the fraction of offending messages is less than 2 3 . By removing them one obtains a new sequence of codes that is C n n∈N , such that for every large enough n
The rate of the n-th code in the new sequence C n n∈N is R − log(3) n , and the loss is negligible for large n. (68a) is the small maximal error probability requirement from (13a). It remains to show that (68b) implies SS. Recall that P (C n ) is induced by a uniformly distributed message, i.e., P (C n ) = p (U) Mn . For any q ∈ P(M n ), let P (C n ,q) be the induced probability distribution when M ∼ q. Namely, P (C n ,q) is given by (36), but with q(m) instead of 1 |Mn| . For any q ∈ P(M n ), consider the following:
where (a) follows by a similar reasoning as step (c) in the derivation of (55) (see (56)), while (b) is because P
Z|M=m , for any q ∈ P(M n ). Maximizing both sides of (69) over all q ∈ P(M n ) establishes the SS requirement from (13b).
Finally, we apply Fourier-Motzkin Elimination on (38), (49) and (63), to eliminate R 1 and R 2 . Doing so shows that any R < R A p U,V,X|S is achievable. Maximizing over all p U,V,X|S establishes Theorem 1.
Remark 8 (Alternative Security Analysis)
The security analysis shows that under the conditions (38) and (63), the induced conditional distribution of Z given U and M approximates a product measure p n Z|U , on average over the messages. Since the inner layer codebook (encoded by U ) carries no confidential information, this implies a vanishing information leakage. An alternative approach to establish this is to make the induced conditional distribution of Z given M (without the conditioning on U) be a good proxy of p n Z . This also implies security because
The SCL for superposition codebooks implies that the RHS of (70) decays exponentially fast to 0, provided that
Replacing (63) with (71) and combining it with (38) and (49), achieves any R with
Seemingly, the best secrecy rates our scheme achieves is the maximum between the RHS of (72) andR A p U,V,X|S from (14) . However, a closer examination ofR A p U,V,X|S reveals that when optimizing over all p U,V,X|S ,R A p U,V,X|S is actually redundant. To see this, notice that for any p U,V,X|S , This implies that R A is at least as high as the maximal R A p U,V,X|S .
Remark 9 (SS via Strong Soft-Covering)
The above proof establishes SS via expurgation. The random coding argument first produces a sequence of codes that attain strong secrecy. Then, the messages with the highest information leakage are eliminated to obtain SS. Another approach is to derive SS directly from the random coding argument using a pair of strong SCLs. Namely, using Lemma 4 one can show that the probability that the the approximation from (39) fails is doubly-exponentially small. Having that, the heterogeneous strong SCL from [29, Lemma 1] further implies that P (Cn)
Z|M=m,U is close in total variation to p n Z|U , for each m ∈ M n (rather than on average as above). The continuity of mutual information over discrete probability spaces with respect to total variation would then imply SS with (doublyexponentially) high probability, with respect to the random coding ensemble. Although this approach is not necessary here, we note it because it applies in various scenarios where the expurgation argument fails. Such scenarios include compound or arbitrarily varying settings, as well as cases where instead of (or in addition to) a secret message transmission, the legitimate parties aim to agree upon a semantically secured secret key. A key is typically required to be approximately uniform; however, expurgation can alter the distribution of the key. Strong soft-covering arguments enable SS proofs in all these aforementioned instances (see [24] , [27] , [29] ).
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
We studied SD-WTCs with non-causal encoder CSI. A novel lower bound on the SS-capacity was derived. Our coding scheme is based on a superposition codebook, which encodes the confidential message in the outer layer. The codebook has sufficient redundancy to facilitate correlating both layers and the transmission with the observed state sequence. The correlation is attained using the likelihood encoder [12] . SS is ensured via distribution approximation arguments and the expurgation technique. The structure of the rate bounds for secrecy implies that the eavesdropper can decode the inner layer codeword. Since no confidential information is encoded in the inner layer, this doesn't compromise security. The gain from doing so is that decoding the inner layer exhausts the eavesdropper's channel resources. Consequently, this prevents him from inferring any information on the outer layer, which contains the confidential message.
Our result was compared to several previous achievability bounds from the literature. Notably, a comparison to the best past achievable scheme for the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI from [11] revealed that our scheme not only captures it as a special case, but also strictly outperforms it in some cases. We further showed that our scheme achieve the SS-capacity of the reversely less noisy SD-WTC and the semi-deterministic SD-WTD, where Y = y(X, S) is the legitimate receiver's observation. The latter can also be retrieved from [11] , and even from the simpler achievable regions of [4] , [5] .
APPENDIX A SOFT-COVERING LEMMAS
A. Strong Soft-Covering Lemma for Superposition Codes
The SS analysis for the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI relies on a SCL for superposition codes. Here, we give a strong version of this lemma (in the spirit of [27] , [29] ). The proof of Theorem 1 only uses a classic soft-covering statement (i.e., convergence in expectation). We present the stronger version for two reasons. First, the SS derivation in the proof of Theorem 1 can be preformed directly using the stronger version. Second, we believe that the sharp claim of Lemma 4 could prove useful for other research problems.
The setup is illustrated in Fig. 2 , where inner and outer layer codewords are uniformly chosen and passed through a DMC to produce an output sequence. The induced distribution of the output should be asymptotically indistinguishable from a product measure. The approximation is in terms of relative entropy, which is shown to converge to 0 exponentially quickly with high probability. The negligible probability is doubly-exponentially small with the blocklength n. 
denotes a fixed codebook. Letting B n be the set of all possible outcomes of B n , the above construction induces a distribution μ ∈ P(B n ) over the codebook ensemble. For every B n ∈ B n , we have
(73) For a fixed superposition code B n , the output sequence W is generated by independently drawing I and J from I n and J n , respectively, and feeding u(i) and v(i, j) into the DMC p n W |U,V . The induced distribution on I n × J n × U n × V n × W n by P (Bn) is 9
Accordingly, the induced output distribution is
We also set P (B n , i, j, u, v, w) μ(B n )P (Bn) (i, j, u, v, w) ,
and denote by P P P the probability measure induced by P . This notation is used in the remainder of this section and in 9 To simplify notation, from here on we assume that quantities of the form 2 nR , where n ∈ N and R ∈ R + , are integers. Otherwise, simple modifications of some of the subsequent expressions using floor operations are required. the proof of the following strong SCL. When switching to other probability measures, we do so in accordance with the notation defined in Section II.
Lemma 4 (Strong Superposition SCL) For any
there exist γ 1 , γ 2 > 0, such that for n large enough
The proof of the lemma is relegated to Appendix B, where exact exponents is found.
B. Strong Soft-Covering Implies Classic Soft-Covering
The strong superposition SCL stated above implies the convergence to zero of the corresponding expected value [27, Lemma 2] . The expected value result is used for SS analysis in the proof of Theorem 1. For completeness, we next restate Lemma 2 from [27] ; the proof is omitted.
Lemma 5 (Stronger than Classic Soft-Covering)
Under the framework of Lemma 4, let γ 1 , γ 2 > 0 be such that (78) holds for n large enough. Then, for every such n we have
where μ W = min w∈supp(pW ) p W (w) > 0.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We state the proof in terms of arbitrary distributions (not necessarily discrete). When needed, we will specialize to the case where W is finite. For any fixed superposition codebook B n , denote the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the induced distribution with respect to p n W by
In the discrete case, Δ Bn is a ratio of PMFs. Accordingly, the relative entropy of interest, which is a function of B n , is
To describe the jointly-typical set over u-, vand w-sequences, we first define information density i p W |U :
In (82), the arguments of the logarithms are the Radon-Nikodym derivatives of p W |U=u and p W |U=u,V =v , respectively, with respect to p W . Let 1 , 2 ≥ 0 be arbitrary (determined later) and define A 1 , 2 as the set of all (u, v, w) ∈ U n × V n × W n satisfying
Note that
We split P (Bn) W into two parts using indicator functions. For every w ∈ W n , define
The measures P Bn,1 and P Bn,2 on the space W n are not probability measures, but P Bn,1 + P Bn,2 = P (Bn) W for each codebook B n . For every w ∈ W n , we also define Δ Bn,j (w) dP Bn,j dp n W (w), j = 1, 2.
With respect to the above definitions, Lemma 6 states an upper bound on the relative entropy of interest. 
where h(·) is the binary entropy function.
The proof of the lemma is omitted as it follows the same steps as in the proof of [27, Lemma 3] (see Appendix B therein). Based on Lemma 6, to prove Lemma 4 it suffices to show that the probability (with respect to a random superposition codebook) of the RHS of (87) not vanishing exponentially fast to 0 as n → ∞, is double-exponentially small. Note that P Bn,1 usually contains almost all of the probability mass. That is, for fixed B n , we have (88), shown at the bottom of this page, which becomes (89), shown at the bottom of this page, when the codebook is random. In (89), the RHS is an average of exponentially many i.i.d. random variables bounded between 0 and 1. The expected value of each is the exponentially small probability of correlated sequences being atypical, as seen in (90), shown at the bottom of this page, where the last inequality uses the union bound and holds for any λ ≥ 0.
We further bound the two terms from the RHS of (90) by exponentially decaying functions of n as follows. For the first term, consider: 
dP Bn,2 = 1 − dP Bn,1
dP Bn,2 = 2 −n(R1+R2)
where (a) is Markov's inequality, (b) follows by restricting λ to be strictly positive, while (c) is the definition of Rényi divergence of order λ + 1. We use units of bits for mutual information and Rényi divergence to coincide with the base two expression of rate. For the second term from the RHS of (90), we have
where
for every α > 1 and 1 , 2 ≥ 0, over which we may optimize. The optimal choices of 1 and 2 are apparent when all bounds of the proof are considered together (some yet to be derived).
, and for any α > 1 set
(2)
Substituting into β (1) α, 1 and β (2) α, 2 gives
α,
Observe that (1) α,δ1 and
α,δ2 in (95) are nonnegative. For example,
The properties of Rényi divergence imply the existence of α > 1, for which (96a) and (96b) are positive.
Lemma 7 (Strictly Positive Exponents)
There exists an α > 1 such that β (j) α,δj > 0, for j = 1, 2.
Lemma 7 is proven in Appendix C and shows that the RHS of (93) exponentially decays with n. To bound the probability (with respect to a random superposition codebook) of (89) not producing this exponential decay, we use a Chernoff bound. 
These bounds are proven in [27, Appendix C] . Having Lemma 8, we show that dP Bn,2 is exponentially small with a probability doubly-exponentially close to 1. To do so we exploit the fact that for any j ∈ J n , the structure of the superposition code implies that U(i), V(i, j) i∈In comprises i.i.d. pairs of random variables. Consequently, denoting
we have that f U(i), V(i, j) i∈In are i.i.d. for any j ∈ J n , and that
(99) For any c ∈ R + consider now the following:
Using (97b) on each summand from the RHS of (100) with
α,δ 2 , B = 1, and c μ = 2:
Inserting (101) into (100), we have
for which α > 1 can be chosen to produce a doubleexponential convergence to 0 of the RHS because for any α > 1, we have
(103) We next treat Δ Bn,1 (w), for w ∈ W n , and show that it also decays exponentially fast with a probability doublyexponentially close to 1. To simplify notation, for each w ∈ W n , let g w :
(104) Accordingly, note that
where the RHS is an average of 2 nR1 i.i.d. random variables due to the structure of the superposition codebook. Next, for any c ∈ R + and i ∈ I n define
Consider the upper bound in (107), shown at the bottom of this page, on the probability that Δ Bn,1 (w) is lower bounded by a constant c ∈ R + . To invoke the Chernoff bound from (97a) on P 1 (i, u), where i ∈ I n and u ∈ U n , first note that conditioned on U(i) = u, g w U(i), V(i, j) j∈Jn are i.i.d. Furthermore, each g w U(i), V(i, j) is upper bounded by 2 n I(U,V ;W )+ 
(107) 
α,δ 2 , and c = c · μ, for any c ≥ 1 μ , gives
For P 2 we have that 2 −nR2 j∈Jn g w U(i), V(i, j) i∈In are i.i.d. by the codebook construction. The conditioning on D(c ) c implies that each random variable 2 −nR2 j∈Jn g w U(i), V(i, j) , for i ∈ I n , is almost surely bounded between 0 and c · 2 n I(U;W )+ (1) α,δ 1 . The expectation of each term with respect to the codebook is bounded above by one, which follows by removing the indicator function from g w U(i), V(i, j) . Setting M = 2 nR1 , μ = 1,
α,δ 1 , and any c ∈ [1, 2] into (97b), gives
Inserting (109) and (110) into (107), we have that for any
Our next step is to choose c and c to get the doubleexponential decay on the RHS of (111). Let
and note that the exponent is strictly positive since
α,δ2 + 2β
where (a) is because
α,δ2 = R 1 +R 2 −I(U, V ; W )− δ 2 and the positivity is by choosing α as in Lemma 7 and since δ 2 < 2δ 1 . Consequently, c → ∞ as n → ∞, and, therefore,
for sufficiently large n. Since c is unbounded (as a function of n), for n large enough we also have ln c − 1 ≥ 1, which simplifies the RHS of (111) as
which decays doubly-exponentially quickly to 0. Setting c = 1 + 2 −n δ 1 4 , we upper bound the second term from the RHS of (111) by
which also converges to 0 with double-exponential speed because δ 1 < δ 2 . Concluding, (111), (114) and (115) upper bound the probability of interest as
At this point, we specialize to a finite W. Consequently, Δ Bn,2 is bounded as
almost surely. Notice that the maximum is only over the support of p W , which makes this bound finite. The underlying reason for this restriction is that with probability 1 a conditional distribution is absolutely continuous with respect to any of its marginals.
Having (102), (116) and (117), we can now bound the probability that the RHS of (87) is not exponentially small. Let S be the set of superposition codebooks B n ∈ B n , such that all of the following are true:
First, we use the union bound and the fact that W n is only exponentially large, to show that the probability of a random codebook not being in S is double-exponentially small:
where (a) is the union bound, and (b) uses (102), (116) and (117). Next, we claim that for every codebook in S, the RHS of (87) is exponentially small. Let B n ∈ S and consider the following. For every x ∈ [0, 1], h(x) ≤ x log e x , which, together with (118a), implies that h dP Bn, 1 = h dP Bn,2 < 2 log e − log 2 · log 2 −nβ (1) α,δ 1 + 2 −nβ
where (a) follows by setting β α,δ1,δ2 min β (1) α,δ1 , β (2) α,δ2 . Furthermore, by (118b), we have dP Bn,1 log Δ Bn,1 < dP Bn,1 log 1 + 2 −n δ 1
where (a) is since log(1 + x) ≤ x log e, for every x > 0. Finally, using (118c) and the definition of β α,δ1,δ2 , we obtain dP Bn,2 log Δ Bn,2 ≤ dP Bn,2 log max
Combining (120) 
where (a) comes from setting c α,δ1,δ2 4 log e + 2β α,δ1,δ2 log 2 + log e + 2 log max
This implies that 
where (a) follows from (119), while (b) is because β (1) α,δ1 ≤ 1 2 (R 1 − δ 1 ) and β (2) α,δ2 ≥ 0. Denoting c δ1,δ2 sup α>1 c α,δ1,δ2 , (125) further gives
Since (126) holds for all α > 1 (the interesting values of α are those from Lemma 7, but the derivation is valid for all α > 1), it must also be true, with strict inequality in the LHS, when replacing γ α,δ1,δ2 with γ δ1,δ2 sup α>1 γ α,δ1,δ2 , which is the exponential rate of convergence we derive for the strong SCL for superposition codes.
we get exponential convergence of the relative entropy at rate O(2 −nγ δ 1 ,δ 2 ) with doubly-exponential certainty. Discarding the precise exponents of convergence and coefficients, we state that there exist γ 1 , γ 2 > 0, such that, for n large enough,
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 7
The proof uses basic properties of Rényi divergence (see, e.g., [30] ). First, recall that for fixed measures μ and ν, d α (μ, ν) is monotone non-decreasing in α. Furthermore, if μ ν then d α (μ, ν) is continuous in α ∈ (1, ∞]. Since a joint distribution is always absolutely continuous with respect to the product of its marginals and by the choices of δ 1 and δ 2 , there exist α 1 , α 2 > 1 such that
Setting α = min{α 1 , α 2 }, we have β (j) α,δj > 0, for j = 1, 2.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
To prove R A ≤ R Alt A , note that the two first rate bounds in R Alt A (see (14) ) are the same as those defining R A , while the third bound in R Alt A is obtained by adding the first bound from R A with I(U ; Y ) − I(U ; S), which we know is non-negative by (19) .
For the opposite direction consider the following. Let p U,V,X|S : S → P(U × V × X) an optimizer of R Alt A such that R Alt A = R Alt A (p U,V,X|S ) > 0 (otherwise there is nothing to prove). Recall that the mutual information terms in R Alt A (p U,V,X|S ) are taken with respect to p p S p U,V,X|S p Y,Z|X,S . First, note that if p U,V,X|S is such that I(U ; Y ) − I(U ; S) ≥ 0, then R Alt A ≤ R A (p U,V,X|S ) = R A and the desired inequality holds.
Otherwise, if p U,V,X|S has I(U ; Y )−I(U ; S) < 0, let U = (U,Ṽ ) and V = V , whereṼ is V passed through an erasure channel, with erasures independent of all the other random variables. Denoting the probability of an erasure by ∈ [0, 1], the joint distribution of (S, U, V, X, Y, Z,Ṽ , U , V ) is
where pṼ |V : V → V ∪ {?}, with ? / ∈ V, is the transition probability of a BEC( ). The value of will be specified later. All subsequent information measures in this proof are taken with respect to (129) or its marginals.
We first show that ∈ [0, 1] can be chosen such that p U ,V ,X|S is a valid input distribution in R A , i.e., satisfying
Consider by the second rate bound in R Alt A . We set ∈ [0, 1] such that I(U ; Y ) − I(U ; S) = 0, thus satisfying (130).
We next evaluate R A (p U ,V ,X|S ). Starting from the second rate bound, we have
where (a) uses the Markov chain (S, U, X, Y, Z) − V −Ṽ , which follows becauseṼ is a noisy version of V .
For the first rate bound, note that
where (a) and (b) follow by Markovity. A similar derivation also gives
We complete the proof by considering two cases. First, if I(V ; S|U ) ≥ I(V ; Z|U ), we obtain
where (a) is (134) 
where (a) is (134), (b) is by the assumption in the second case, (c) uses (131) with I(U ; Y )−I(U ; S) = 0, and, finally, (d) follows by the third rate bound in R Alt A . Concluding, we obtain
APPENDIX E PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
A. Direct
We use Theorem 1 to derive achievability of Corollary 1. For any q U,V,X|S : S → U × V × X, replacing Y and Z in R A q U,V,X|S with (Y, S 1 ) and (Z, S 2 ), respectively, implies achievability of
To properly define the q U,V,X|S that achieves (25), recall the p distribution stated after (24) that factors as p S p A|S p B|A p X p S1,S2|S p Y,Z|X . Letp be a PMF over S × A × B × X × Y × Z × S 1 × S 2 × B × X , such that p S,A,B,X,S1,S2,Y,Z,B,X = p S,A,B,X,S1,S2,Y,Z 1 {B=B}∩{X=X} .
(140) Now, fix p S,A,B,X,S1,S2,Y,Z and let q U,V,X|S in (14) be such that V = (A, B)p, U = (B,X)p and q X|S,U,V =p X = p X , where the subscriptp means that the random variables on the RHS are distributed according to their marginal from (140). Consequently, Q U,V,X|S p S1,S2|S p Y,Z|X is equal to the RHS of (140). We next evaluate the mutual information terms in R A to show it coincides with (25) . We again use the notation I q , Ip and I p to indicated that the underlying PMF is q,p or p, respectively. We have 
where (a) is becauseB = B andX = X almost surely and sincep S,A,B,X,S1,S2,Y,Z = p S,A,B,X,S1,S2,Y,Z .
Step 
where: (a) is for the same reason as step (a) in the derivation of (141); (b) is because in p we have the Markov chain (A, B, X) − S − S 1 , since X is independent of (A, B, S, S 1 ) and due to the chain rule; (c) follows because under p, (X, Y ) is independent of (A, B, S 1 ) and since I(B; S|S 1 , A) = 0 as B − A − (S, S 1 ) is also a Markov chain. Finally, we shown that the third term from the RHS of (139) is since I q (V ; S|U ) ≥ I q (V ; Z, S 2 |U ) for the aforementioned q U,V,X|S . Consider 
where: (a) is due to similar arguments as those justifying (141) Consequently, the third term in R RLN A (q U,V,X|S ) is redundant because of (142). Along with (141), this establishes the direct part of Corollary 1.
B. Converse
Let c n n∈N be a sequence of (n, R) semantically-secure codes for the SD-WTC with a vanishing maximal error probability. Fix > 0 and let n ∈ N be sufficiently large so that (13) holds. Since both (13a) and (13b) hold for any message distribution q ∈ P(M n ), in particular, they hold for a uniform p (U) Mn . All the following multi-letter information measures are calculated with respect to the induced joint PMF from (9) , where the channel p Y,Z|X,S is replaced with p S1,S2,Y,Z|X,S defined in Section IV-C.1. Fano's inequality gives
where n = 1 n + R. The security criterion from (13b) and the reversely less noisy property of the channel p Y,Z|X (that, respectively, justify the two following inequalities) further gives 
where: (a) is by (144) and (145) while setting δ n n + n ; (b) is a telescoping identity [31, Eqs. (9) and (11) 
where (a) uses (13b) and (151) and defines n n + n , and (b) follows by the chain rule and since conditioning cannot increase entropy.
Another way to bound R is:
where (a) is due to (151) and because M and S n are independent in (9), while (b) is similar to step (b) in (152). Having (152)-(153), the converse is established by standard time-sharing arguments (as in Appendix E).
APPENDIX G PROOF OF LEMMA 2
First note that for any C n ∈ C n and (i, j, m, s) ∈ I n × J n × M n × S n , we have 
where (a) is due to (155), (b) follws by symmetry of the codebook with respect to m ∈ M n , (c) is Pinsker's Inequality, and (d) is Jensen's inequality.
To conclude the proof, note that the expectation on the RHS of (157) falls within the framework of the SCL for superposition codes (Lemma 5), with the DMC p n S|U,V . Taking (R 1 , R 2 ) as in (38) implies that there existα > 0 such that for any n large enough
Combining this with (157) proves Lemma 2 with α =α 2 .
APPENDIX H PROOF OF LEMMA 3
To simplify notation, throughout his proof we abbreviate I P (Cn ) and I Q (Cn ) as I P and I Q , respectively. Consider: The function x → −x log x is monotone increasing for x ∈ 0, 2 − 1 ln 2 and, for large enough values of n, we have e −nβ1 ∈ 0, 2 − 1 ln 2 . Therefore, as P 
for the aforementioned values of n. This implies that (53) holds and concludes the proof of Lemma 3.
